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 FACTUALLY INNOCENT WITHOUT DNA? AN ANALYSIS OF UTAH’S 
FACTUAL INNOCENCE STATUTE 
 
Nic Caine* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“One thing we’ve learned by studying these cases and litigating these cases is 
it could really happen to anybody, . . . [n]obody is immune.”1 With the advent of 
DNA identification technology in the late 1980s, the American criminal justice 
system underwent a transformation as the legal field and the public placed more 
focus on innocence related issues. In fact, a law school professor cleverly termed 
this phenomenon “innocentrism.”2 Currently, all but one state has a postconviction 
DNA testing statute to prove innocence.3 DNA identification technology has 
provided many individuals a chance at freedom.4 Many other prisoners claiming 
innocence, however, do not have the benefit of DNA evidence, but they do have 
other compelling “newly discovered” evidence that may prove their innocence. For 
these prisoners, the majority of states have direct or collateral remedies to obtain 
new trials or habeas relief, but only Utah and Virginia have postconviction statutes 
that provide an avenue to prove factual innocence without the use of DNA.5 
This Note first gives a brief background of the innocence movement. Then it 
discusses Utah’s non-DNA factual innocence statute, including the legislative 
history, and gives examples of two cases that have been filed under the statute. 
Next, the Note discusses the necessity of postconviction, non-DNA innocence 
statutes. Finally, the Note discusses whether Utah’s statute should be the model for 
other states and what problems exist with Utah’s statute as written.6 
 
 
* © 2013, Nicholas E. Caine, J.D. candidate, 2013, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney 
College of Law. I would like to thank Professor Jensie Anderson and Utah Assistant 
Attorney General Patrick Nolan for their assistance with this Note. 
1 John Eligon, New Efforts Focus on Exonerating Prisoners in Cases Without DNA 
Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, at A26 (quoting Professor Daniel S. Medwed). 
2 Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1549 (2008) 
(“‘[I]nnocentrism,’ derives mainly from the emergence of DNA testing and the subsequent 
use of that technology to exonerate innocent prisoners.”). 
3 See Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Access_To_PostConviction_DNA_Testing.php 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (explaining that Oklahoma does not yet have a DNA statute 
incorporated into its state law).  
4 Id. 
5 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-402 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
327.10 (West 2007). 
6 The Note does not engage in a comparison of Utah’s statute to Virginia’s, instead 
the focus of this Note is Utah’s factual innocence statute. 
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II.  BACKGROUND OF DNA AND NON-DNA INNOCENCE 
 
On August 14, 1989, Gary Dotson, who had spent ten years in prison and on 
parole for a rape conviction, became the first person exonerated by DNA 
evidence.7 Since 1989, there have been 292 postconviction DNA exonerations in 
the United States—in thirty-six different states—and the exonerees have served 
approximately 3,839 years in prison, collectively.8 Many different factors have 
been discussed as causes of wrongful convictions including: eyewitness 
misidentification, invalidated or improper forensic science, false confessions and 
incriminating statements, and criminal informants or “snitches.”9 Additionally, 
ineffective assistance of defense counsel, incentives for prosecutors to win, and 
tunnel vision—which can each cause prosecutors and police to ignore exonerating 
evidence and other possible suspects—play a role in wrongful convictions.10 
“DNA has undermined the concerns of finality and reliability [of convictions] 
. . . [because] pieces of stray evidence that would play at most a tangential role two 
decades ago—can now demonstrate guilt or innocence decades after a 
crime . . . .”11 However, many issues exist with DNA evidence and its relation to 
innocence claims. First, few criminal investigations result in the collection of 
biological evidence.12 Second, even if biological evidence is present at the 
beginning of the investigation, the evidence is often lost, destroyed, or degraded 
over time.13 Third, “human error or misconduct can lead to unsound results or 
7 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523 (2005). 
8 For a current list of exonerated individuals see DNA Exonerations Nationwide, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/DNA_Exonerations_ 
Nationwide.php (last visited Aug. 3, 2013); Browse Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/Browse-Profiles.php (last visited Aug. 3, 2013). 
9 The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence 
project.org/understand/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
10 See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-
Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 132–40 (2004). 
11 Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1631 (2008). 
12 SEE, E.G., DANIEL S. MEDWED, UP THE RIVER WITHOUT A PROCEDURE: 
INNOCENT PRISONERS AND NEWLY DISCOVERED NON-DNA EVIDENCE IN STATE 
COURTS, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 656–57 (2005) (“EVIDENCE SUITABLE FOR DNA 
TESTING, HOWEVER, EXISTS ONLY IN A SMATTERING OF CRIMINAL CASES: AN 
ESTIMATED 80–90% OF CASES DO NOT HAVE ANY BIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE.”). 
13 Id.; New York City Cases that Were Closed When Evidence Could Not Be Located 
at NYPDs Pearson Place Warehouse, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence 
project.org/Content/New_York_City_Cases_that_Were_Closed_When_Evidence_Could_
Not_Be_Located_at_NYPDs_Pearson_Place_Warehouse.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) 
(“In New York City, 50% of cases the Innocence Project closed [between 1996 and 2006] 
were closed because of reports that evidence was lost or destroyed . . . at Pearson Place 
Warehouse.”); DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenc
eproject.org/Content/DNA_Exonerations_Nationwide.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
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analysis.”14 Fourth, problems exist with the preservation of DNA evidence, as only 
about half the states have statutes that compel preservation and many states employ 
restrictions that result in large quantities of evidence being destroyed.15 Finally, 
current DNA statutes contain hurdles for petitioners, including filing requirements, 
standards of proof, statutes of limitation, prerequisites to obtain testing, and so 
forth.16 
Furthermore, because DNA technology has proven that mistakes are made, 
the testing of DNA evidence has now become a part of the investigation. Thus, the 
evidence weeds out the innocent suspects at the front end, reducing the number of 
wrongful convictions in cases where biological evidence is available.17 Others 
worry that DNA will mislead courts and litigants into thinking that DNA evidence 
is the “only conclusive evidence of innocence.”18 Moreover, DNA can lead to a 
“false promise of simplicity in assessing guilt and innocence . . . thereby 
threaten[ing] to undermine . . . the presumption of innocence.”19 
Nevertheless, these issues only pertain to DNA cases. Non-DNA cases 
provide their own issues and challenges. Innocence claims in non-DNA cases are 
inherently more difficult to prove as they rely upon recantations, unreliable 
forensic science evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and prosecutorial 
conduct—none of which conclusively prove that the defendant is innocent.20 Also, 
lawyers may be reluctant to take these cases because of their difficulty and 
expense, as they “often require cumbersome investigations, including finding and 
re-interviewing witnesses or poring over thick files to find anything vital that a 
trial lawyer might have missed.”21 Finally, “even when crucial evidence is 
uncovered . . . judges, juries and prosecutors often treat it with skepticism.”22 
14 Garrett, supra note 11, at 1648 (“A series of DNA laboratories have been 
investigated for systemic errors, and at least three individuals have been wrongly convicted 
based on faulty DNA testing or analysis.”). 
15 For further discussion of restrictions some preservation statutes contain and ideas 
about what should be contained in a preservations statute see Preservation of Evidence, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Preservation_Of_ 
Evidence.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
16 See Kathy Swedlow, Don’t Believe Everything You Read: A Review of Modern 
“Post-Conviction” DNA Testing Statutes, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 355, 356–82 (2002) 
(discussing the basic parameters of the various DNA testing statutes, issues relating to the 
statutes, and how to expand the more confining language in the statutes); see also Garrett, 
supra note 11, at 1635. 
17 Medwed, supra note 2, at 1557; see also BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL 
INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT 323 (2003) 
(“[T]he era of DNA exonerations will come to an end. The population of prisoners who can 
be helped by DNA testing is shrinking, because the technology has been . . . clearing 
thousands of innocent suspects before trial.”). 
18 Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1188–89 (2011). 
19 Id. at 1189. 
20 Id. at 1161–62; see also Medwed, supra note 12, at 658–59. 
21 Eligon, supra note 1. 
22 Id. 
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Although non-DNA innocence is more difficult to prove, the number of non-
DNA exonerations is now approaching the number of DNA exonerations.23 Thus, 
DNA “no longer defines the Innocence Movement.”24 The countless individuals 
claiming innocence, without DNA evidence, can no longer be overlooked. 
However, only Utah and Virginia have taken the ultimate step in enacting 
postconviction non-DNA innocence statues.25 
 
III.  OVERVIEW: UTAH’S POSTCONVICTION FACTUAL INNOCENCE STATUTE26 
 
Utah, like many other states, took action as DNA testing became more 
prevalent in the criminal justice system. In 2001, Utah passed a bill entitled 
“Postconviction Testing of DNA,” which provided an avenue to seek exoneration 
through DNA technology.27 For many years, however, Utah had only the appeals 
process by which innocent prisoners could be exonerated for reasons other than 
DNA.28 Finally, in 2008, Utah passed the “Postconviction Determination of 
Factual Innocence” statute, which provided individuals, without DNA evidence, a 
way to prove their factual innocence. The statute “establishe[d] a two-step claim 
process: an individual must first petition the court for a hearing to determine 
factual innocence . . . and if the petition meets the requirements of section 78B-9-
402, a hearing will be held at which the petitioner bears the burden of proving 
factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.”29 
The factual innocence statute is broken into five parts. Section 78B-9-401.5 
contains definitions for important terms, including: “factual innocence,” and 
“newly discovered material evidence.” Section 78B-9-402 discusses the necessary 
petition requirements, steps to preserve evidence, and other general procedures for 
the court and petitioner. Additionally, “section 78B-9-402 establishes two tracks 
for obtaining a factual innocence hearing: one applicable to any person . . . 
convicted of a felony offense . . . and another for any person who has secured 
reversal or vacatur of [a] conviction and is not facing retrial or appeal.”30 Section 
23 Samuel R. Gross et al., supra note 7, at 524 (finding that out of 340 exonerations, 
196 did not involve DNA; however, some of these exonerations were due to executive 
clemency or states that posthumously acknowledged the exoneree’s innocence after the 
individual died in prison). 
24 Findley, supra note 18, at 1193; see also Medwed, supra note 2, at 1571 (“DNA 
exonerations are the tip of the innocence iceberg.”). 
25 This Note does not discuss Virginia’s statute nor its related case law. 
26 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-401 to -405 (LexisNexis 2012). 
27 Id. §§ 78B-9-300 to -304. 
28 Creighton C. Horton II, Legislative Update: Working Together for Justice: Utah’s 
Exoneration and Innocence Assistance Bill, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 107, 112. 
29 Miller v. State, 226 P.3d 743, 746–47 (Utah Ct. App. 2010). 
30 Id. at 749. After Miller, the statute changed so that an individual who already 
obtained postconviction relief now falls under subsection (5). Also the language “in the 
same form and manner as described above” was added in 2010 bringing into question the 
court’s decision that a petition filed under (2)(b) is not constrained by the requirements of 
(2)(a). 
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78B-9-403 gives general information regarding appointment of counsel, the 
effectiveness of counsel, and appeals. Section 78B–9–404 provides information 
about the hearing, the burden of proof, and the court’s determination and actions. 
Finally, section 78B–9–405 discusses the financial assistance provision. To better 
understand the importance of the statute this Note discusses the legislative history 
and the two cases that led to exoneration under the statute. 
 
A.  Legislative History 
 
The “Exoneration and Innocence Assistance” bill was first introduced during 
the 2006 General Session by Representative David Litvack, who had been 
contacted by a University of Utah law student worried about exonerees being 
released from prison with few resources and no financial assistance.31 The bill had 
two major objectives: “to provide a mechanism for exoneration in non-DNA cases, 
and to provide some measure of restitution to those who have been wrongfully 
convicted and incarcerated.”32 Due to foreseeable problems, which gave the bill 
little chance to pass, Creighton Horton, then Assistant Attorney General for the 
State of Utah, suggested that Representative Litvack pull the bill and work with a 
committee to draft a new bill “that would accomplish the same major objectives, 
but have the support of the key players in the system.”33 
Soon after, a committee of innocence advocates and prosecutors formed and 
met regularly, discussing issues with the bill and its objectives.34 The committee 
first drafted a process for prisoners without DNA evidence to petition a court for a 
finding of factual innocence, and then addressed the “innocence assistance” 
portion of the bill.35 The new draft of the bill was presented in the 2007 General 
Session, sponsored by Representative Litvack.36 The assistance provision raised 
many concerns for the legislators, including one individual who wanted to remove 
it entirely.37 Thus, committee members had to work hard to demonstrate that the 
provision was not only fiscally conservative, but that Utah would ultimately spend 
less money by implementing the law.38 The bill passed in the House by a margin of 
sixty-four to eight; however, it was near the end of the legislative session and the 
bill was not heard in the Senate.39 
To prepare for the 2008 General Session, the bill was presented in 2007 to the 
Judiciary Interim Committee, who unanimously voted to pass the bill out favorably 
as a committee bill.40 Senator Greg Bell sponsored the 2008 bill. It passed the 
31 Horton, supra note 28, at 107. 
32 Id. at 107–08. 
33 Id. at 108. 
34 Id. at 108–09. 
35 Id. at 109. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 109–10. 
39 Id. at 110. 
40 Id. 
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Senate, was unanimously supported by the House Judiciary Standing Committee, 
and unanimously passed the House.41 The bill became law on May 5, 2008, and 
has since been amended in 2009, 2010, and 2012.42 Despite the amendments, the 
major objectives—providing an avenue for exonerations in non-DNA cases and 
providing financial assistance to exonerees—remain intact.43 
 
B.  Case Examples: Two Exonerations Under the Statute 
 
Since the factual innocence statute was passed in 2008, two individuals have 
been exonerated under the statute.44 These exonerations depict both tracks for 
proving factual innocence.45 The first person exonerated under the statute was 
Debra Brown, who followed the first track as she could not prove her factual 
innocence with DNA.46 The second person exonerated was Harry Miller, who 
followed the second track as his charges had been previously dismissed before he 
filed his petition.47 Further analysis of these cases will provide a greater 
understanding of the statute’s importance. 
 
1.  Debra Brown48 
 
On the morning of November 7, 1993, Ms. Brown called 911 after finding her 
employer dead at his home. The victim had been shot in the head three times and 
was found in his bed with the sheets pulled up to his shoulders. Officers questioned 
Ms. Brown several times that day and searched her truck and purse. Ms. Brown 
stated that she had brought some soup to the victim the previous afternoon because 
he was ill, but after knocking on the door with no answer, she left the soup on the 
porch with a note. She returned the next morning to find the soup and note still on 
the porch and again knocked, but there was no response. She retrieved a key to the 
victim’s home from her truck, let herself in, and found the victim. 
After searching the victim’s home, officers found that items were missing. 
They also found traces of blood around the kitchen sink and a small handprint on 
41 Id. (“The bill went through the entire process, from introduction to passage, in less 
than three weeks, and was one of the first bills to pass during the 2008 session.”). One of 
the causes for the quick passage of the bill was the fact that the debate over the assistance 
portion changed to whether exonerees would receive enough assistance under the bill. Id. 
42 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-401 to -405 (LexisNexis 2012). 
43 Although a major objective and important part of the statute, the financial 
assistance portion is not the focus of this Note and will not be discussed further. 
44 See Exonerated!, INNOCENCE NEWS (Rocky Mountain Innocence Ctr., Salt Lake 
City, Utah), Fall 2011, at 1, 1, available at http://rminnocence.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2011/07/RMIC-Fall-Newsletter-2011.pdf [hereinafter RMIC Fall Newsletter]. 
45 Miller v. State, 226 P.3d 743, 749 (Utah Ct. App. 2010). 
46 See RMIC Fall Newsletter, supra note 44. 
47 Miller, 226 P.3d at 745. 
48 The following facts were taken from State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 339–45 (Utah 
1997). 
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the front door. However, none of the missing items were found in Ms. Brown’s 
possession, the handprint did not match Ms. Brown’s, and no blood was found on 
her clothes. Further, Ms. Brown willingly cooperated with investigators, was 
interviewed more than twenty times in the three months of investigation, and 
consistently denied any involvement in the crime. She was charged with 
aggravated murder on September 12, 1994. 
During trial the prosecution presented the following evidence: investigators 
determined there was no forced entry; only two keys existed to get in the home and 
Ms. Brown had one; tests revealed that the victim had been shot with a .22 caliber 
handgun and the victim owned a .22 caliber Colt Woodsman handgun that was 
missing; the medical examiner testified that the time of death was likely between 
9:00 p.m. Friday, November 5, and 3:00 a.m. Sunday, November 7; a neighbor 
testified that she heard two “pops” that she believed were gunshots on Saturday 
morning around 7:00 a.m.;49 several forged checks payable to Ms. Brown had 
cleared the bank in October, and some canceled checks and the victim’s October 
1993 bank statement were missing; bank representatives testified that the statement 
was mailed and the postmaster testified that it was 97% likely the victim had 
received the statement and canceled checks; and finally, Ms. Brown made an 
inconsistent statement about why she left the soup on the porch. No direct physical 
evidence linking Ms. Brown to the murder was ever discovered.50 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court rejected Ms. Brown’s arguments51 
because she failed to proffer evidence that polygraph examinations are reliable 
scientific evidence, she strategically chose not to object during the prosecutors 
closing arguments, and circumstantial evidence supported the jury’s decision.52 
Ms. Brown did not appeal the Utah Supreme Court’s decision.53 In 2002, the 
Rocky Mountain Innocence Center began investigating Ms. Brown’s case and in 
March of 2009 filed a petition under the Postconviction Remedies Act (“PCRA”) 
and a petition for Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence.54 The State 
filed a motion for summary judgment as to the PCRA claim, which the court 
granted.55 
49 The defense presented testimony from another neighbor who testified that he heard 
no gunshots that morning. But the defense was unable to establish Ms. Brown’s 
whereabouts for the period between 6:40 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. on Saturday. 
50 Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 (“The State’s case was based solely on circumstantial 
evidence.”). 
51 Id. at 340–46 (arguing that the trial court erred in barring admission of the results of 
a polygraph examination showing she had been truthful, the trial court failed to intervene 
when the prosecutor made certain comments during closing arguments, and that the 
evidence was insufficient). 
52 Id. 
53 State v. Brown, No. 100903670, slip op. at 1–2 (Utah Dist. Ct., May 2, 2011). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 2 n.1. Neither the State’s motion nor the memorandum decision issued by the 
court addressed the petition for postconviction determination of factual innocence. 
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However, the factual innocence petition continued and in January 2011, the 
Second District Judicial Court held an evidentiary hearing.56 Ms. Brown presented 
five pieces of “newly discovered” evidence, which she argued proved her factual 
innocence under the statute. The State argued that a rational basis still existed for 
the conviction, as the “newly discovered” evidence had not rebutted the evidence 
presented at trial.57 
The five pieces of evidence that Ms. Brown presented are as follows. First, 
Logan City Police Department had information about another suspect. Second, a 
witness gave a statement identifying another suspect as the likely perpetrator.58 
Third, witness statements and police files showed that neighbors heard gunshots at 
times when Ms. Brown had a solid alibi and contrary to the time of death relied 
upon by the prosecution. Fourth, the October bank statement never arrived at the 
victim’s home, many people knew the victim had guns and large amounts of 
money, the home was not secure, and Ms. Brown was not the only person with a 
key.59 Finally, police notes indicated that officers mishandled the crime scene, 
failed to collect important physical evidence and test blood evidence, and failed to 
properly follow up on leads.60 
After the evidence was presented, the court found that the victim was alive in 
the afternoon on November 6, 1993.61 Moreover, the court found that, because Ms. 
Brown established her whereabouts for Saturday afternoon and early Sunday 
morning, she could not have killed the victim during the time the murder likely 
occurred.62 Therefore, the court concluded that Ms. Brown was factually innocent, 
and on May 9, 2011, after seventeen years, she walked out of prison and into the 
arms of family members and friends.63 
On May 26, 2011, however, the State filed a notice of appeal and the Utah 
Supreme Court heard arguments on September 4, 2012. As expected, the main 
issue was whether the evidence proved Ms. Brown’s factual innocence.64 The State 
argued that Ms. Brown did not establish that no reasonable trier of fact could find 
her guilty.65 They stated that nothing corroborated the statements made by another 
witness about seeing the victim alive at a time that contradicted the time of death 
56 Id. at 3 (discussing reopening the case to receive additional testimony on certain 
items of evidence and taking the case under advisement at the conclusion of the evidentiary 
hearing on March 7, 2011). 
57 Id. at 4–6. 
58 Id. at 4–5. 
59 Id. at 5. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 45. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.; see RMIC Fall Newsletter, supra note 44. 
64 Oral Argument, Brown v. State, 2013 WL 3486849 (Utah, July 12, 2013) (No. 
20110481), available at http://www.utcourts.gov/courts/sup/streams/index.cgi?mon=20129 
(follow the “listen” link for “Session 1” on Sept. 4, 2012, at the bottom of the page). 
65 Id. at 11:21–11:37. 
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asserted at trial.66 Additionally, they argued that the evidence needed to prove 
innocence must be substantial newly discovered evidence and cannot be old 
evidence.67 Ms. Brown argued that the newly discovered evidence proved that the 
victim could not have been killed during the time the State argued he had.68 
Further, she argued that it would be wrong to ignore previously known or old 
evidence in a determination of factual innocence.69 
During oral arguments, Justice Lee questioned Ms. Brown’s alibi, with the 
State arguing that she put herself at the crime scene and had not shown that she did 
not kill the victim at any other time.70 Justice Parrish and Justice Durham 
questioned the State changing its theory as to the time of death stating that it would 
be unfair for the State to shift the time frame now because they made the time of 
death an element of the crime at trial when they asked for the alibi instruction.71 
Finally, Justice Durham pointed out that the State did not prove that Ms. Brown 
was the only one who could have committed the crime.72 On July 12, 2013, the 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed the post-conviction court’s determination of Ms. 
Brown’s factual innocence.73 The court has yet to render a decision and, based on 
the arguments, it is difficult to say how the court will rule. The court’s ruling, 
whatever it may be, will likely affect the factual innocence statute and petitions 
going forward. 
 
2.  Harry Miller 
 
Mr. Miller was arrested in 2003 and was convicted for aggravated robbery. At 
trial, Mr. Miller argued that he was at home in Louisiana at the time of the crime; 
however, no witnesses testified to corroborate his story. On appeal, Mr. Miller 
argued ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to obtain alibi 
witnesses. The court granted Mr. Miller’s motion for remand and instructed the 
district court to conduct a hearing. On remand, the district court determined Mr. 
Miller’s trial counsel did not act deficiently because Mr. Miller did not provide 
information to locate any alibi witnesses. The court also found that, even if counsel 
was ineffective, Mr. Miller was not prejudiced, as additional evidence of alibi 
would not have affected the outcome. The court then returned the case to the court 
of appeals. 
Before arguments, however, the parties filed a stipulated motion for summary 
reversal of Mr. Miller’s conviction and requested a new trial in the interest of 
66 See id. at 8:15–9:10, 10:00–10:15. 
67 Id. at 42:10–43:29. 
68 Id. at 18:25–21:54. 
69 Id. at 17:30–18:25. 
70 Id. at 11:58–13:28, 25:36–26:22. 
71 Id. at 44:09–46:04. 
72 Id. at 47:09–47:46. 
73 Brown v. State, 2013 UT 42, ¶ 2. 
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justice. The court of appeals granted the motion and remanded for a new trial.74 
Mr. Miller’s retrial never happened because, prior to the new trial, prosecutors 
filed a motion to dismiss the charges and Mr. Miller was released from custody 
nearly four and half years after his arrest.75 
Mr. Miller then filed a petition to determine his factual innocence pursuant to 
the statute.76 The State opposed the petition for three reasons. First, the petition 
“did not allege facts sufficient to meet the statutory requirements . . . particularly 
because the petition failed to identify newly discovered evidence or evidence that 
was not cumulative of evidence presented at trial.”77 Second, “the combination of 
evidence supporting the petition does not lead to a determination of Miller’s 
factual innocence.”78 Third, Mr. Miller’s “trial counsel was not ineffective.”79 Mr. 
Miller argued his petition was appropriate because of his alibi, because certain 
“statutory requirements could be waived ‘in the interest of justice,’” and because 
the facts—as a whole—showed his factual innocence.80 The trial court determined 
that Mr. Miller’s petition failed to satisfy the statutory requirements under section 
78B-9-402(2)(a) of the Utah Code and thus granted the State’s motion to dismiss.81 
Mr. Miller appealed the court’s decision.82 
On appeal, the court found that two tracks existed under the statute to prove 
factual innocence, and a petition filed under then subsection 2(b) did not need to 
meet the statutory requirements of subsection 2(a).83 The court also discussed the 
new evidence obtained regarding the alibi defense.84 This evidence showed (1) Mr. 
Miller was hospitalized in Louisiana on November 25, 2000, after having a stroke, 
(2) he was released three days later to his sister, and (3) he was provided with a 
home health care nurse.85 Mr. Miller’s employment records “show[ed] that he was 
absent from work for medical reasons from November 25 through December 13, 
2000.”86 An affidavit from a registered nurse, who provided home health care to 
Mr. Miller, stated that she visited him on December 7, 2000, and again on 
December 14, 2000. Finally, the nurse’s assessment on December 14, stated Mr. 
Miller was “[a]ble to ride in a car only when driven by another person OR able to 
74 The preceding and following facts were taken from Miller v. State, 226 P.3d 743, 
745–51 (Utah Ct. App. 2010). The appellate court did not review the trial court’s findings 
regarding ineffectiveness of Mr. Miller’s trial counsel. See id. 
75 Id. at 745. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 746. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-402(2)(a)(vi)(C) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) 
(amended in 2010 and repealed by Factual Innocence Amendments, 2012 Utah Laws 896)). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 749. 
84 Id. at 750. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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use a bus or handicap van only when assisted or accompanied by another 
person.”87 
Based on the new evidence, the court concluded that Mr. Miller raised a bona 
fide issue of factual innocence. It found that his stroke limited his physical 
mobility, and testimony indicated he “had only slightly more than twenty-four 
hours to fly from . . . Louisiana to Utah in order to commit an act of physical 
violence against a complete stranger.”88 Thus, the court reversed and remanded so 
that Mr. Miller could receive a factual innocence hearing.89 With the new evidence 
supporting his alibi, state officials agreed to Mr. Miller’s exoneration.90 On 
September 12, 2011, the court “pronounced Mr. Miller factually innocent and 
ordered the state to give him financial assistance payments for the years he spent 
wrongly imprisoned.”91 
 
IV.  THE NECESSITY OF NON-DNA FACTUAL INNOCENCE STATUTES 
 
Debra Brown and Harry Miller are examples of individuals who did not have 
DNA evidence, but had other evidence that proved their innocence. Fortunately, 
Utah has a non-DNA factual innocence statute that provided an avenue leading to 
the determination that they are factually innocent.92 Only two states, however, have 
a non-DNA statute.93 Nevertheless, each state provides other avenues for 
postconviction relief without DNA.94 Thus, do other states really need 
postconviction non-DNA factual innocence statutes? To answer this question this 
Note will discuss other forms of postconviction relief offered to individuals 
claiming innocence. 
Professor Daniel Medwed stated “more than ever . . . state post-conviction 
procedures comprise the most appropriate vehicle to rectify wrongful convictions 
and a subset of those procedures, the rules concerning newly discovered evidence, 
have the potential to operate as the principal engine driving cases toward fair 
resolutions.”95 Innocent prisoners seeking post-conviction relief still have other 
mechanisms for obtaining relief; however, it is difficult for those without DNA 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 751. 
90 See RMIC Fall Newsletter, supra note 44. 
91 Id. 
92 Utah has other avenues of obtaining postconviction relief including motions for 
new trial with newly discovered evidence and the PCRA; however, like other 
postconviction claims, these impose strict requirements, a statute of limitations, and do not 
deem the individual “factually innocent.” See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 24; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 
78B-9-101 to -110 (LexisNexis 2012). 
93 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
94 See id. at 675. 
95 Id. at 718. 
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evidence, as many roadblocks exist.96 Two frequently used postconviction 
innocence claims include ineffective assistance of counsel claims and Brady 
claims.97 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims most often center on defense 
counsel’s failure to do something that would have supported the defendant’s 
innocence.98 A Brady claim argues that the prosecution withheld evidence that 
would have supported an innocence claim.99 Under either claim, the defense bears 
the burden of establishing that the evidence might have made a difference in the 
outcome of the case.100 Although these claims provide an avenue to postconviction 
relief, “their prejudice and materiality components act as constraints on, rather than 
paths to, vindication.”101 Moreover, even if the defendant meets the burden, the 
prosecution can retry the defendant.102 
Postconviction relief can also be obtained through newly discovered evidence 
claims in “a mélange of direct and collateral remedies: motions for a new trial, 
procedures created by statutes and court rules in the nature of coram nobis, 
applications for common law coram nobis relief, and . . . habeas corpus 
petitions.”103 In seeking such relief, however, prisoners encounter many procedural 
limitations including statute of limitations, restrictions on the forum, and 
limitations on appellate review.104 Also, “state courts have traditionally viewed 
newly discovered evidence claims with disdain, fearing the impact of such 
96 See Daniel S. Medwed, California Dreaming? The Golden State’s Restless 
Approach to Newly Discovered Evidence of Innocence, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1437, 1440 
(2007) (“[D]efendants face an uphill battle in non-DNA cases . . . . This intrinsic difficulty 
is aggravated by . . . burdensome state court procedures that ultimately fail to provide 
potentially innocent defendants with adequate access to the courts.”). 
97 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Findley, supra note 18, at 1194. Others, however, argue that 
individuals who obtain relief from these claims should not be called innocent “when all 
they managed to do was wriggle through some procedural cracks in the justice system.” 
Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501, 508 (2005). 
98 Findley, supra note 18, at 1194. 
99 Id. 
100 See id. (“The Supreme Court has made it clear that this . . . standard requires a 
lesser showing: that the error ‘undermine[s] confidence in the outcome.’” (alteration in 
original)); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that . . . the results of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”). 
101 Findley, supra note 18, at 1195. 
102 Id. 
103 Medwed, supra note 12, at 675; see id. at 664–86 (discussing the history of these 
remedies and current direct and collateral relief based on newly discovered evidence 
through a motion for a new trial or through the procedures of coram nobis and habeas 
corpus). 
104 See id. at 683–86 (discussing statutes of limitation, forum issues, and limited 
appellate review); see also id. at 717 (“[T]he rising number of procedural hurdles prisoners 
must overcome to obtain relief . . . through a writ of habeas corpus has made that option 
effectively unavailable.”). 
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claims . . . , and harboring doubts about the underlying validity of new 
evidence.”105 Furthermore, “standards for granting relief based on newly 
discovered evidence vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction . . . .”106 Usual standards 
“involve . . . showing[] that the new evidence could not have been discovered prior 
to trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence; that the evidence is relevant and 
not cumulative or merely impeaching; and that the new evidence creates a 
sufficient probability of a different result at a new trial.”107 
Some states have created measures to remedy the difficulty of state 
postconviction relief based on new evidence of innocence and permit innocent 
individuals to obtain an official declaration of innocence through judicial 
findings.108 In Illinois, an exonerated person may seek a “certificate of innocence” 
from the court.109 In North Carolina, a three-judge panel decides whether the 
person has proven innocence by clear and convincing evidence.110 But these 
statutes contain rather strict criteria for proving innocence and are “grossly under-
inclusive, because of the high burden of proof they impose.”111 Many factually 
innocent individuals will lack the resources and evidence to prove their innocence 
years after the crime.112 
Finally, individuals can attempt to seek relief through direct appeals, parole, 
or executive clemency. But direct appeals are not always successful. Various 
hurdles—such as trial court discretion and the defendant’s burden—make it 
difficult to obtain relief. Parole is not always a feasible solution as parole boards 
customarily require a showing of remorse, “which puts actually innocent prisoners 
in a Catch-22: continue to proclaim innocence or boost the chances for parole by 
‘admitting’ guilt.”113 Finally, obtaining executive clemency is rare and may be 
more politically motivated than aimed at correcting the injustice of wrongful 
convictions.114 
With the majority of cases lacking DNA evidence, there are many individuals 
in prison who are claiming innocence but who do not have DNA evidence. They 
could turn to the other postconviction procedures for relief, but they are most likely 
unattainable due to the many roadblocks and difficulties. Thus, “the innocence 
movement must capitalize on this unique epoch in the history of criminal law by 
encouraging the passage of legislation structured to limit wrongful convictions in 
105 Id. at 664–65 (citations omitted). 
106 Findley, supra note 18, at 1197. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 1198–1200. 
109 See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-702 (West 2011). 
110 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1469(h) (2011). 
111 Findley, supra note 18, at 1200. 
112 Id. 
113 Medwed, supra note 12, at 717. 
114 Id. 
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non-DNA cases.”115 States need to adopt some form of postconviction non-DNA 
statue, similar to Utah’s statute, to allow the innocent without the benefit of DNA 
evidence an avenue and a chance to prove their factual innocence. 
 
V.  UTAH’S CURRENT STATUTE AS A MODEL FOR OTHER STATES 
 
Having determined that states should adopt postconviction non-DNA factual 
innocence statutes, should they use Utah’s as a model? With only two 
postconviction non-DNA factual innocence statutes currently enacted, states do not 
have a wide variety of examples to guide them in drafting similar statutes.116 
Furthermore, the Utah and Virginia statutes differ in various aspects, with the latter 
lacking clear definitions, requiring more content in the petition, and applying a 
different standard for the courts’ determination.117 Thus, in keeping with the goal 
of providing a chance at postconviction relief for those who do not have DNA 
evidence, Utah’s statute provides a fairer avenue to obtain relief. But issues and 
concerns still exist with Utah’s statute.118 
The first major issue is with the requirement for “newly discovered evidence.” 
The statute does not give courts direction as to whether a finding of factual 
innocence must be based exclusively on newly discovered evidence or a 
combination of new and old evidence.119 Often the newly discovered evidence 
relates to evidence already presented at trial. Thus, if the court cannot consider that 
evidence, it likely will be difficult for someone to prove factual innocence. Some 
argue that the goal is to determine innocence and so we should look at all the 
evidence regardless of whether it is old or new evidence.120 But allowing the 
petitioner to essentially reopen the case may prove problematic. Many years have 
likely passed since trial, thus, investigators and witnesses may not be available or 
remember anything, and other evidence may have been lost or destroyed. This was 
one of the main issues set forth before the Utah Supreme Court in Ms. Brown’s 
case. The old evidence in Ms. Brown’s case was necessary to corroborate her story 
and prove her innocence. Without that evidence, it is likely she would still be 
sitting in a jail cell today. In its decision, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that 
115 Medwed, supra note 2, at 1571; see also id. (“Innocentric arguments should be 
reconfigured . . . away from DNA cases and toward those cases bereft of the magic bullet 
of science.”). 
116 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
117 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-327.10 to -327.14 (West 2007). 
118 Email from Patrick Nolan, Assistant Utah Att’y Gen., Utah Att’y General’s Office, 
to Author (June 29, 2012, 08:45 MST) (“[A]mendments to the statute . . . tightened some 
things up. There is, however, an increasing sense of frustration among the county attorneys 
over this statute.”) (on file with author). 
119 See State v. Brown, No. 100903670, slip op. at 16, 20–21 (Utah Dist. Ct., May 2, 
2011) (holding that a court can base its determination either solely on new evidence or a 
combination of both old and new evidence). 
120 Interview with Jensie Anderson, Clinical Professor, S.J. Quinney College of Law, 
in Salt Lake City, Utah (Aug. 1, 2012). 
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the plain language of the statute allows a determination of factual innocence based 
on both old and new evidence.121 Thus, barring a statutory amendment, the court 
has answered this question concerning newly discovered evidence. 
Another concern surrounds the financial assistance for exonerees. Fortunately, 
Utah’s statute does have a compensation provision. Issues arise, however, as to 
whether the amount given to the innocent individual is enough and also whether 
the statute should provide access to job training and educational, health, and legal 
services after an innocent person’s release. Some suggested additions to the statute 
include providing exonerees with help securing affordable housing, medical, 
dental, and counseling services.122 Additionally, Professor Jensie Anderson123 
found issue with not awarding financial payments if the finding of factual 
innocence occurs after the death of the petitioner.124 She discussed the toll on the 
families of those individuals, who are victims and should be compensated for the 
loss of that individual from their lives during the time spent in prison.125 
Exonerated individuals often spend many years in prison, losing income and 
the opportunity to gain experience, skills, and job training. This makes it difficult 
for them to obtain employment upon release. Without adequate compensation and 
assistance via job training and other services, exonerees are unlikely to be able to 
provide for themselves or their families. Compensation and payment for services 
will likely have to come from the state or county that prosecuted the individual. 
This will take money away from county or state prosecutor offices, which means 
less money to assist those offices in investigating and prosecuting crimes, causing 
them to fight “innocence” petitions even more aggressively than they currently 
do.126 
Professor Anderson has raised additional issues. First, many have argued that 
there should be a one-year statute of limitations, as exists in the PCRA.127 
Professor Anderson stated that the problem with this is that cases take years to 
investigate, and if there were a one-year limitation, it would put another procedural 
hurdle in the way of innocence petitioners—one that would prevent cases from 
121 Brown v. State, 2013 UT 42, ¶ 45. 
122 See AN ACT CONCERNING CLAIMS FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND 
IMPRISONMENT § 4 (Innocence Project, Inc. 2010), available at http://www.innocence 
project.org/docs/model/Compensation_Model_Bill.pdf. 
123 Professor Jensie Anderson is the clinical professor at the S.J. Quinney College of 
Law in charge of the Innocence Clinic and is a member of the Board of Directors for the 
Rocky Mountain Innocence Center. 
124 Interview with Jensie Anderson, supra note 120; see also UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78B-9-402(14) (LexisNexis 2012) (“The assistance payment provisions of Section 78B-
9-405 may not apply, and financial payments may not be made, if the finding of factual 
innocence occurs after the death of the petitioner.”). 
125 Interview with Jensie Anderson, supra note 120. 
126 See Medwed, supra note 10, at 127–30 (discussing various ways in which 
prosecutors resist “legitimate post-conviction innocence claims”). 
127 Interview with Jensie Anderson, supra note 120. 
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being filed.128 Similar to allowing a court to consider old evidence, however, if too 
many years pass it may be difficult to locate witnesses and other evidence, even 
without a statute of limitations. Professor Anderson also discussed the problem 
that the statute allows the State to file for summary judgment at any point during 
the proceedings if the State believes the material facts are undisputed. But 
petitioners cannot file for summary judgment at all, even if the newly discovered 
evidence overwhelmingly proves their innocence.129 
Professor Anderson further discussed the “knowledge of the evidence” 
standard.130 She stated it is difficult to meet that standard, as the State can argue 
that most anything could have been discovered through reasonable due 
diligence.131 She discussed that often the petitioner’s trial counsel decided not to 
follow up on a certain piece of evidence for tactical reasons and that evidence ends 
up proving the person’s innocence.132 Her final concern related to the amount of 
legislation regarding the statute.133 She stated that if the legislature continues to 
chip away at the statute and create more procedural roadblocks, the statute will 
become unworkable.134 
Other issues concern the application of the statute. Patrick Nolan135 argued 
that “we have yet to see consistent and critical preliminary review of these 
petitions by the courts on the front end.”136 To clarify this statement he explained, 
“The courts seem to be far too willing to take the petitions at face value, without 
analysis as to whether there actually exists newly discovered material evidence of 
factual innocence; and seem to be unwilling to dismiss frivolous petitions.”137 
Additionally, Mr. Nolan argued that the courts have been reluctant to dismiss the 
petitions summarily, and they have a tendency to grant the petitioner a hearing, 
even when the law clearly supports a summary conclusion to the litigation.138 
However, two recent district court opinions show that judges are following 
the statute and dismissing petitions that do not meet the requirements under the 
statute. In one case the petitioner relied solely on the recantation of the victim and 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id.; see UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-402(3)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring 
petitioner to assert that “neither the petitioner nor petitioner’s counsel knew of the evidence 
at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed 
post-trial motion or postconviction motion, and the evidence could not have been 
discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner’s counsel through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence”). 
131 Interview with Jensie Anderson, supra note 120. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Patrick Nolan is the former Assistant Utah Attorney General who had dealt with 
every factual innocence petition filed in Utah at the time of the writing of this Note. 
136 Email from Patrick Nolan, supra note 118. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
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two other submitted statements.139 The court applied section 78B-9-402(4) of the 
Utah Code and dismissed the petition, as it was based solely on the alleged (and at 
best equivocal) recantation of the victim.140 The other case also involved a 
recantation. Only one of the victims recanted, however.141 That court, also relying 
on section 78B-9-402(4) of the Utah Code, dismissed the petition because the 
recantation was not credible given the prior testimony of both victims and the other 
victim reaffirmed her testimony.142 Both of these cases show that judges, at the 
preliminary stages, are following the statute and dismissing cases that do not 
establish a “bona fide and compelling issue of factual innocence.”143 
In addition to Professor Anderson’s and Mr. Nolan’s concerns, other issues 
remain. First, no definition, or case law for that matter, defines “reasonable 
diligence” as it applies to the knowledge standard of newly discovered evidence.144 
Another concern surrounds the “clear and convincing” standard.145 Proponents of 
the innocence movement would likely find that this standard is too high, seriously 
limiting petitions. Opponents likely take the opposite stance, however, and believe 
the standard should be higher, similar to how prosecutors must prove guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Also, the statute diminishes a petition based solely on 
recantation testimony.146 There has yet to be a definition of what is equivocal or 
self-serving and how that is determined.147 Also, although recantations are not the 
strongest piece of evidence as they inherently carry a credibility issue, the statute 
diminishes their value outright and essentially pushes judges to dismiss them or at 
the very least not pay attention to them. 
On the other hand, the Utah statute is also very advantageous to petitioners. 
First, it allows the court to review “evidence that was suppressed or would be 
suppressed at a criminal trial,” “hearsay evidence,” and “the record of the original 
criminal case and at any postconviction proceedings in the case.”148 Second, it 
contains no statute of limitations, allowing petitioners time to locate and review 
documents and talk to witnesses. Third, not only can an incarcerated individual 
take advantage of the statute, but also those who may have already had their 
charges reversed or vacated. Finally, and most importantly, the statute allows an 
139 See State v. Myers, No. 120100270, slip op. at 1–2 (Utah Dist. Ct., Oct. 4, 2012). 
140 Id. at 3. (finding the alleged recantations were qualified with statements from the 
victim such as “I forgive him” and “everybody deserves a second chance” and that “the 
alleged recantation was not signed under penalty of perjury while the victim’s prior 
statements were”). 
141 See State v. Wamsley, No. 120409899, slip op. at 2 (Utah Dist. Ct., Oct. 11, 2011). 
142 Id. 
143 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-402(9)(c) (NexisLexis 2012). 
144 See id. § 78B-9-402(3)(a)(i) (requiring, but failing to define, knowledge and 
“reasonable diligence”). 
145 Id. § 78B-9-404(1)(b). 
146 See id. § 78B-9-402(4). 
147 See State v. Myers, No. 120100270 (Utah Dist. Ct., Oct. 4, 2012); Wamsley, No. 
120409899 (Utah Dist. Ct., Oct. 11, 2011). 
148 Id. § 78B-9-404(2)–(3). 
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innocent prisoner who has other non-DNA evidence a chance to be found factually 
innocent. 
Utah’s current non-DNA statute is not perfect and, like most controversial 
issues, the “factual innocence” statute has two sides. Thus, it is difficult to say 
whether Utah’s current statute should be the model for other states, but it is 
definitely a good place to start. Certainly, changes could be made and only time 
will tell if the issues surrounding the statute will be resolved. There is no question 
that the ideal statute would be fair to both sides, giving each a chance to prove 
whether a person is truly innocent. In its current format, however, the factual 
innocence statute appears to be close to “a satisfactory balance between finality 
and efficiency, on the one hand, and justice for the actually innocent on the 
other.”149 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Since 1989, DNA evidence has fueled the innocence movement, helping 
hundreds prove their innocence and obtain freedom. DNA technology has been an 
invaluable development for the innocence movement, and DNA technology will 
continue to advance and improve in the future. DNA evidence is not available in 
the majority of cases, however, and many believe that DNA exonerations will 
eventually diminish as DNA analysis becomes more widely available. 
Furthermore, “for every DNA exoneree there are hundreds if not over a thousand 
wrongfully convicted defendants whose cases do not contain biological evidence 
that could prove innocence.”150 It is time for other states to follow Utah’s lead and 
adopt a postconviction non-DNA statute to provide a better avenue for innocent 
individuals who do not have DNA evidence. It is time to give them a chance to tell 
their stories of innocence. 
Debra Brown and Harry Miller were both charged and convicted of crimes 
they did not commit. They both went down the road of appeals and were met with 
utter disappointment as their convictions were upheld. Fortunately for them, the 
factual innocence statute provided a different route that, although difficult, gave 
them a chance to tell their stories of innocence and walk away factually innocent of 
the crimes they were charged with. They, like most of us, likely never expected 
something like that to happen to them. However, as Professor Medwed stated, “it 
could really happen to anybody.”151 When it does happen again and there is no 
DNA evidence, hopefully, for the individual wrongfully convicted, a 
postconviction non-DNA statute similar to Utah’s will be available to prove the 
accused’s factual innocence. 
149 Medwed, supra note 12, at 687. 
150 Glenn A. Garber & Angharad Vaughan, Actual-Innocence Policy, Non-DNA 
Innocence Claims, N.Y. L.J., April 4, 2008, at 4. 
151 Eligon, supra note 1, at 26. 
                                                          
